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Abstract 
More than a dozen studies of the Complex Trial Protocol (CTP) version of the P300-based 
Concealed Information Test have been published since its introduction (Rosenfeld et al., 2008), 
and it has been fairly consistently proven to provide high accuracy and strong resistance to 
countermeasures (Rosenfeld et al., 2013). However, no independent authors have verified these 
findings until now. In the present, first independent study, we corroborate the accuracy and 
countermeasure-resistance of the CTP, when the probe item (critical presented information, e.g., 
crime detail; P) vs. all irrelevant items (Iall) comparison is used for classifying participants as 
guilty or innocent, but we also show that the CTP is severely vulnerable to countermeasures, 
when the P vs. the irrelevant item with the largest P300 responses (Imax) comparison is used. 
This latter measure can be defeated by creating “oddball” items among the irrelevant items 
(through targeting them with covert responses), and thereby making their P300 responses 
statistically indistinguishable from those of the probe item. Practical implications are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Undetected deception may have high costs in certain scenarios, for example in connection 
with legal cases or counterterrorism – however, meta-analyses show that humans, without special 
aid, are rarely able to reliably discriminate lies from the truth, most usually demonstrating 
judgment accuracies similar to pure chance (Bond and DePaulo, 2006; Hartwig and Bond, 2011; 
Kraut, 1980). Moreover, no significant individual differences can be found; neither experience 
nor training improves the accuracy of judgments (Bond and DePaulo, 2008; Meissner and 
Kassin, 2002). As a technological aid, the polygraph was invented just about a century ago, and 
is today widely used in many countries all over the world. While it provides higher than chance 
accuracy, it suffers from various limitations, including severe vulnerability to countermeasures 
(National Research Council, 2003). 
 
1.1 The P300 as a tool for detecting concealed information 
A prominent alternative under development is the P300-based deception detection that is 
based on analyzing neural activity recorded by electroencephalography (EEG). In an EEG 
examination, electrodes are placed on the scalp, through which electrical activity in the brain can 
be detected. The P300 is an event-related potential with a positive peak arising most prominently 
above the parietal lobe, beginning usually around 300 ms after stimulus presentation (review: 
Polich, 2007). It is typically obtained through the “oddball” paradigm: when presenting a random 
sequence of stimuli, an infrequent stimulus will evoke the P300 wave if it is task-relevant and 
requires an overt or covert response that is different from the rest of the stimuli (so-called 
“standards”). Importantly, the probability with which a stimulus occurs robustly influences the 
magnitude of the P300: infrequent salient stimuli evoke larger P300 waveforms – an effect which 
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is considered to reflect the involvement of limited-capacity cognitive processes in the generation 
of the P300 (Polich, 2007). According to the influential context-updating theory of the P300 
(Donchin, 1981; Donchin and Coles, 1988), this waveform represents the updating of stimulus 
representations in working memory, a process that is highly context-dependent, i.e., is influenced 
by both immediate stimulus history and task demands (previous knowledge, expectation, 
selective attention, etc.). Alternatively, the P300 has been linked to the formation of decisions, 
reflecting the gradual accumulation of evidence until a decision boundary is reached (O’Connell 
et al., 2012; Twomey et al., 2015). Finally, more recent accounts of the P300 emphasize the 
reactivation of previously established stimulus-response associations, a process that also depends 
on stimulus frequency (Verleger et al., 2014; 2015).       
The sensitivity of the P300 to stimulus context and task demands can be used in the 
Concealed Information Test (CIT), also known as the Guilty Knowledge Test, a deception 
detection method that is based on the recognition of a certain stimulus, for example a crime-
relevant information, among other, irrelevant stimuli (Lykken, 1959; Verschuere et al., 2011; 
Verschuere and Meijer, 2014). In an often used example to describe the CIT, various items are 
sequentially presented to a murder suspect, any of which could be the murder weapon, for 
example: “gun,” “knife,” “rope,” etc. One of these items is a probe item: the true murder weapon 
with which the actual crime was committed. All other items are conventionally called irrelevant 
items. In EEG studies pertinent to our study, the number of different irrelevant items typically 
ranges from four to eight, and each item (including the probe) is equally repeated for example 40 
or 50 times, presented in a random sequence. It is assumed that the suspect will recognize the 
true murder weapon only if he/she has participated in the murder. The recognition of the true 
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murder weapon, as a consequently salient item among other items, will result in a detectably 
larger average P300 response. 
Numerous articles on this subject have been published since the first successful 
experiments starting from the late 1980s (mainly: Farwell and Donchin, 1991; Rosenfeld et al., 
1988). The great majority of these studies have been conducted in the laboratory of J. P. 
Rosenfeld, where the Complex Trial Protocol (CTP) version of the P300-based CIT was also 
introduced, and has been used in more than a dozen studies by now (Rosenfeld et al., 2013, 
2008). In most of these studies, the CTP has been consistently found to achieve the goals of its 
conception: to improve general accuracy, and more importantly, to resist countermeasures that 
were found to greatly reduce accuracy in previously used methods (Mertens and Allen, 2008; 
Rosenfeld et al., 2004). In a related review published in 2012, the necessity of an independent 
replication of these otherwise successful series of studies was already remarked (Ben-Shakhar, 
2012), but, to the best of our knowledge, no such attempts were reported to date. Besides 
replicating some of the findings, the main purpose of our study was to provide an outside view 
through a reconsideration of the previous studies with an emphasis on the findings related to the 
resistance to countermeasures, which is considered to be a key feature of the CTP method, 
distinguishing it from other deception detection methods (Rosenfeld, 2011; Rosenfeld et al., 
2013). 
 
1.2. Uninvestigated effects of countermeasures 
The most effective countermeasures against the P300-based CIT were found to be 
concealed responses (e.g., small physical movements or recalling a name of a person) that are 
assigned to specific irrelevant items, and executed when those items appear (Mertens and Allen, 
  5
2008; Rosenfeld et al., 2004). It has been reasoned that these covert responses make the 
corresponding irrelevant items relevant during the task, and thus, the probe item would not be the 
only relevant item anymore (Rosenfeld et al., 2004). Consequently, the “oddball” nature of the 
paradigm is weakened, resulting in reduced differences between the probe- and the irrelevant 
item-induced P300 responses – thereby increasing the chances for a guilty participant to be 
classified as innocent. 
As several studies seemed to prove the CTP highly countermeasure-resistant (Hu et al., 
2012; Labkovsky and Rosenfeld, 2012; Rosenfeld et al., 2008; Rosenfeld and Labkovsky, 2010; 
Winograd and Rosenfeld, 2011), more recent research focused on other areas (optimization of 
parameters, etc., Hu et al., 2013; Meixner and Rosenfeld, 2014; Rosenfeld et al., 2015a, 2015b; 
Winograd and Rosenfeld, 2014). However, these studies have been using two kinds of P300-
based measurements for the classification of participants as guilty or innocent, namely, the “P vs. 
Iall,” and the “P vs. Imax” measures – and the countermeasure effects on the P vs. Imax were not 
as thoroughly tested, as on the P vs. Iall measure. The original P vs. Iall measure has been 
regularly used for classification since the first P300-based CIT studies (Farwell and Donchin, 
1991; Wasserman and Bockenholt, 1989), including all CTP articles (see Rosenfeld et al., 2013). 
The “P vs. Imax” measure was introduced along with the CTP as an alternative analysis method 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2008), and has been used and reported in subsequent studies (Meixner et al., 
2009; Meixner and Rosenfeld, 2014, 2011; Rosenfeld and Labkovsky, 2010), but not in all of 
them (see Rosenfeld et al., 2013).  
While the P vs. Iall measure compares the P300 responses to the probe (P) with the P300 
responses to all irrelevant items (Iall), the P vs. Imax measure compares the P300 responses to 
the probe with the P300 responses to the one irrelevant item that has evoked the largest average 
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P300 among all the irrelevant items (which is the “Imax”). The advantage of this measure – as it 
was argued by the authors (Rosenfeld et al., 2008) – is that it may be able to provide a higher 
specificity (i.e., less false positive classifications). In studies using both measures, they proved to 
provide very similar accuracies, although with the P vs. Imax measure indeed having, in general, 
a slightly higher specificity (Meixner et al., 2009; Meixner and Rosenfeld, 2014, 2011; 
Rosenfeld et al., 2008; Rosenfeld and Labkovsky, 2010), which could indicate that it is the 
preferable alternative. 
Finding an item that evokes the largest P300 response can also have a very important 
practical use in itself. When the relevant detail (i.e., the probe item), is not exactly known, then a 
group of items can be shown to the suspect, out of which the one that evokes the largest P300 
responses would be selected as a “presumed probe.” For example, a terrorist attack is about to 
happen, but it is not exactly known in which city, or on which date the attack will take place, 
although there are several assumed possibilities. In this case, a suspected conspirator could be 
presented these assumed possibilities to determine which of them evokes the largest P300, and 
whether the P300 of this presumed probe is significantly larger than those of the other items. 
This is a scenario that Meixner and Rosenfeld (2011) tested in a mock-terrorism experiment with 
very good results (Meixner and Rosenfeld, 2011; and more details on the theory in Rosenfeld, 
2011, p. 83).  
Since the P vs. Imax measure takes into account the largest irrelevant P300 alone, it is 
considerably more vulnerable to an “outlier” irrelevant item that evokes larger P300 responses 
than the rest of the irrelevant items. In this regard, the Probe vs. Imax approach is not only more 
rigorous in classifying examinees as guilty (Rosenfeld et al., 2008), but, to some extent, it could 
also be sensitive to the use of a countermeasure technique, since an outlier can also be created 
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voluntarily: beside the first “oddball,” i.e. the probe item, one may create a secondary “oddball,” 
through targeting an irrelevant item with a unique covert response, while still keeping the 
majority of irrelevant items comparatively regular. This scenario would create a special oddball 
paradigm, with two salient items, i.e. the probe and the targeted irrelevant item, against the 
majority of the other items (Katayama and Polich, 1999).  
Two articles on the CTP have been published that have examined the effect of 
countermeasures (covert responses) against less than the half of the irrelevant items, but neither 
of these reported P vs. Imax measures (Hu et al., 2012; Labkovsky and Rosenfeld, 2012). 
However, one of these articles (Hu et al., 2012) did report that, in the case of 2 countered 
irrelevant items out of 8, the P300 responses to probe and countered irrelevant items were 
significantly larger than those of non-countered irrelevant items, while, in the cases of 4 and 6 
countered irrelevant items out of 8, only the probe but not the countered irrelevant items evoked 
P300 responses significantly larger than non-countered irrelevant items (Hu et al., 2012, p. 88). 
Despite this observation, no further investigation was recounted in this direction. 
Our hypothesis pertinent to our study was that when only a small group of irrelevant 
items are countered, at least one of them will tend to evoke a P300 that approximates the P300 to 
the probe, and consequently, the accuracy of the P vs. Imax measure will be significantly 
reduced. To provide a clear proof of this vulnerability, we used countermeasures with a few 
small modifications in order to enhance them. 
 
1.3. Restructuring and simplifying countermeasures 
Initial P300-based CIT methods included a designated target item among the irrelevant 
items, to which a different behavioral response (key press) had to be executed when it appeared. 
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However, Rosenfeld and colleagues (2008) have reasoned that this task drains processing 
resources, diverting attention from the recognition of the probe item, and thus also reducing the 
P300 response to it. Therefore the CTP was devised so that the probe and irrelevant items all 
required the same response, a key press indicating merely that the participant saw the displayed 
item (Rosenfeld et al., 2008, pp. 906, 907). Additionally, to hold attention throughout the task, 
after each trial of displaying a probe or an irrelevant item, a simple secondary decision task was 
presented, with a rare target item requiring a button press different from the response to the non-
target items. In most of the following studies, this decision task involved strings of five identical 
numbers, where the string of 11111 was the target, and strings of four other numbers (22222, 
33333, 44444, and 55555) were non-targets. Each of all these stimuli is presented for 300 ms, 
appearing within two seconds after each other, in the typical trial structure. Thus, the CTP 
method may reduce cognitive load during the probe-irrelevant discrimination task, but, overall, 
the combined task is fairly demanding, and especially so if a participant tries to consistently 
execute a number of predefined countermeasures to various items. Our assumption here is that 
the CTP’s resistance to countermeasures is at least partly due to this increased workload, and 
therefore, reducing the difficulty of the execution of countermeasures (i.e., simplifying them), 
will enhance their effects. 
Seven different items were presented in our experiment, including one probe and six 
irrelevant items (following Hu et al., 2013). Out of the six irrelevant items, we chose to have two 
items for “oddballs,” instead of only one, in order to raise the possibility that either one of them 
would evoke large enough P300 responses to defeat the test when using the P vs. Imax measure. 
In previous CTP studies on countermeasures, participants were instructed to execute different 
specific covert responses (typically: mentally say a meaningful personal name, e.g., close 
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relative’s given name) to each irrelevant that was targeted for countermeasures. Thus, to target a 
small, two-item group of irrelevant items, the original countermeasures could be used in the 
following way: silently articulating one specific name whenever one of the two small-group 
irrelevant item appears, and another specific name whenever the other small-group irrelevant 
item appears, while omitting covert responses whenever any of the other items appear (exactly as 
in the following studies: Hu et al., 2012; Labkovsky and Rosenfeld, 2012; Rosenfeld and 
Labkovsky, 2010).  
In our version of countermeasures, participants were instructed to give concealed 
responses to all items: one silent word when either of the two irrelevant items that belonged to 
the “small group” appeared, and another silent word when any of the other items appeared, 
including the probe. This creates a simple, but continually active second task that may divert 
attention from the probe, which becomes, to some extent, simply the part of the larger group of 
irrelevant items. The recalling of the same word for these items of the larger group can also be 
described as giving them a common attribute, and thus making them overlapping. Consequently, 
the more the presented stimuli overlap with each other in their attributes, the smaller the P300 
amplitude differences will be (Azizian et al., 2006; Marchand et al., 2013). 
As the least detectable countermeasure, the silent, mental articulation of words was 
introduced in the study of Rosenfeld and Labkovsky (2010), and used in subsequent studies. 
These words were the first or last names of the participants, and, in some occasions, the first or 
last names of close relatives. Latency measures were not reported, but figures are provided on 
which it is consistently observable that, on the group level, P300 responses to probes and 
countered items peaked during the same time interval (Hu et al., 2012, fig. 2; Labkovsky and 
Rosenfeld, 2012, fig. 5; Rosenfeld and Labkovsky, 2010, fig. 3; Winograd and Rosenfeld, 2011, 
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fig. 2). This shows that the P300 appears as a reaction to the item, and not to the subsequently 
recalled silent word, and it is therefore very likely that the effect on the P300 is caused not by the 
meaningfulness of the silent words, but by the meaningfulness of the countered items, i.e., that 
they are recognized as requiring a specific answer (Rosenfeld et al., 2013, p. 7, drew similar 
conclusions from some suggestive preliminary empirical evidence, citing the abstract of a yet 
unpublished study: Winograd and Rosenfeld, 2012). Possible emotional significance of names 
may have arousing effect, but higher arousal would simply lead to generally larger P300 
responses throughout the task, including those to the probe (Duncan et al., 2009; Polich, 2007).  
For the purpose of our above described countermeasure task, we asked our participants to 
choose any two simple, short (maximum two syllable) neutral words, that are easily 
distinguishable from each other, and which they would be comfortable to be repeating for 20-25 
minutes, i.e., for the duration of the test. 
 
1.5. Study outline 
Four groups were measured: one “innocent” Control group, one “simple guilty” (SG) 
group with no instructions on countermeasures, and two other groups that were instructed to use 
countermeasures. One used our new countermeasures (New-CM group), and the other used the 
original countermeasures (Old-CM group) so that we could replicate previous findings, while 
also directly comparing the two countermeasure methods. In both groups, the countermeasure 
use involved choosing a small, two-item group of irrelevants; this set of items will be called the 
I-2item, while the remaining larger, four-item group of irrelevants will be called the I-4item. 
While the New-CM group used the above described countermeasures, the Old-CM group used 
countermeasures against the I-2item as described in previous studies, i.e., they were instructed to 
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counter one of the irrelevant items by silently articulating the name of one of their parents, and 
another one with the name of the other parent (see in Methods; 2.2. Procedure). 
To summarize our hypotheses: we expected a successful replication of the high accuracy 
rates with the P vs. Iall measure in all groups, but a significant drop in the detection rates with 
the P vs. Imax measure in the two CM groups (but not in the SG group) – and we expected this 
drop to be more pronounced with the enhanced countermeasures in the New-CM group.  
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Sixty-six participants were recruited through advertisements proposing to try our “EEG 
lie detection test,” and offering a cafeteria voucher of Ft500 (approx. €1.60) in case they 
managed to defeat the test. Six participants were excluded: four due to excessive amount of 
artifacts in the EEG recording (over 50% of the trials had to be rejected), another due to 
extremely low accuracy in the decision task (correct responses to the catch trials of the “11111” 
item: 8.6%, correct responses in the cases of the four other strings of numbers: 91.8%), and one 
due to an extremely low rate of correct responses in the main task (66.9% correct). The 
remaining participants consisted of 14 individuals in the Control group (age = 24.5±3.98 years, 
in the format of MEAN±SD, as also in the rest of this paper; 5 males), 15 in the SG group (age = 
21.5±2.42 years; 6 males), 15 in the New-CM group (age = 22.9±3.29 years; 7 males), and 16 in 
the Old-CM group (age = 23.0±3.48 years; 6 males). All participants provided signed, informed 
consent, and, at the end of the experiment, they all received a cafeteria voucher regardless of the 
results of the examination.  
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2.2. Procedure 
In this CIT, we used participants’ family names as probes – except for the Control group, 
in which none of the presented items was relevant to the participants. For this group, we refer to 
the “Probe” item as the irrelevant item that was, unbeknownst to the participant, randomly 
assigned with the same EEG event marker as the Probe (own family name) of the other three 
experimental groups. At the beginning of each experiment, participants were shown a list of 
twenty Hungarian family names, and were asked to indicate if any of these names were 
particularly meaningful (e.g., name of a close relative or friend) or otherwise appeared to them 
markedly unique compared to the other names on the list. Irrelevant items were selected from 
among the family names that were not indicated by the given participant as salient. 
The Old-CM group participants were instructed to use the given names of their parents to 
counter two out of the six irrelevant items (always recalling their father’s name when one 
specific item appeared, and their mother’s name when another specific item appeared). The 
New-CM group participants were asked to choose any two words that were short (one or two 
syllable) and easy to distinguish from each other; for example up/down or dog/cat. One of these 
words was recalled when either of two specific irrelevant item appeared, and the other was 
recalled when any of the other items (including the probe) appeared. We encouraged participants 
in this group to concentrate not on the item, but on which word-category the item belongs to. In 
both CM groups, the words used for countermeasure had to be silently said at the same time or 
after the response key was pushed. None of the participants had any information on the eventual 
irrelevant items in the task until the task began, and countermeasure using participants had to 
choose the small group of two specific irrelevant items during the beginning of the task. 
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The E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, USA) was used to 
present stimuli and record behavioral responses. Stimuli were presented in a 100 cm distance 
from the eye of the participant, on a 20 inch LCD screen. All presented characters were white on 
the black background, with a height subtending a visual angle of approximately .57°.  
Each trial began with a 100 ms baseline period for the recording of prestimulus brain 
activity. The probe or irrelevant item (for the main task) was then presented on the center of the 
screen for 300 ms. Following an inter-stimulus interval that randomly varied between 1400-1700 
ms, one of the number strings (for the secondary task) was presented for 300 ms. The next trial 
began after another randomly varying interval of 2100-2400 ms. During all intervals between 
stimuli, a fixation cross was presented on the center of the screen. For a schematic depiction, see 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Example of a trial in the CTP CIT task in this study. The probe and irrelevant stimuli 
were the given participant’s own family name and other, unfamiliar family names. All these 
stimuli always required the same response with the left hand (pushing one randomly chosen key 
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out of five, with the corresponding finger). This was followed by a target stimulus (11111) or a 
non-target stimulus (22222, 33333, 44444, and 55555). In response to a target stimulus, a key 
had to be pushed by the right middle finger, while in case of a non-target stimulus, another key 
had to be pushed by the right index finger. 
 
In the full task, there were 350 trials in total, consisting of the probe (participant’s family 
name) and six irrelevant items (other family names), each repeated 50 times, for a total of 50 
probe and 300 irrelevant items presented in random order, followed by any of the number strings 
with equal probability (thus 10 times the 35 variations of the pairing of 7 names and 5 number 
strings).  
Before the full task, countermeasure using participants were given a practice task that ran 
exactly the same way as the full task (1 probe and 6 irrelevant items presented in random order), 
except that participants assigned to the New-CM group were presented given names (with 
always the same names - “Ferenc” for males and “Ilona” for females - pointed out as probes1), 
while those in the Old-CM group were presented month names (with “January” as probe). Both 
CM groups were instructed to silently articulate the very same words (New-CM: two freely 
chosen neutral words; Old-CM: parents’ given names) upon stimulus onset. This practice task 
had no time limit, participants could finish whenever they felt ready; this usually took 80-100 
trials. As a next step, participants in all four experimental groups completed another practice task 
using a fixed set of city names (1 probe and 6 irrelevant items with “Budapest” as probe in all 
cases) that lasted for only 35 trials (5 repetitions for each stimulus). Here, participants were 
asked to imagine themselves in a real “lie detection” situation in which they would try to conceal 
                                                            
1 These names were always different from the participants’ own given names. 
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the recognition of the probes. However, participants in the Control and SG groups were not 
instructed to use any specific countermeasures. 
We removed most of the keys from a standard computer keyboard so that a group of five 
keys remained on the left side (to be conveniently pushed by each corresponding finger of the 
left hand) and two next to each other remained on the right side (to be pushed by the right index 
and right middle fingers). At each appearance of a probe or irrelevant item, a key had to be 
pushed with the left hand, each time randomly chosen from the five keys; participants were 
instructed not to follow any specific sequence (see Rosenfeld and Labkovsky, 2010). During the 
recording, we monitored responses to verify that participants were indeed randomly choosing 
keys, and not pushing the same key repeatedly or following a sequence (Rosenfeld and 
Labkovsky, 2010). In the secondary task, one of the keys on the right side had to be pushed with 
the right hand at the appearance of a number string; one with the middle finger for the “11111” 
string, and the other one with the index finger when any of the other number strings appeared 
(“22222”, “33333”, “44444” or “55555”).  
Participants were told that from time to time during the task there would be a pause and 
they would be asked to repeat out loud the last family name that appeared, and more than two 
incorrect answers would mean failing the test. They were actually asked nine times during the 
experiment at random time points. None of the participants had more than two incorrect answers.  
All participants in the three “guilty” groups were explicitly encouraged to try to conceal 
their names and to defeat the test. Participants completed the whole experiment (including 
preparations, practice and full tasks, and debriefing) in 50-60 minutes from their arrival. 
 
2.3. Electrophysiological recordings and data processing 
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A BioSemi ActiveTwo Amplifier (BioSemi B. V., Amsterdam, Netherlands) was used 
with 32 Ag/AgCl electrodes recording EEG from standard scalp sites (Fp1, Fp2, AF3, AF4, F7, 
F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5, FC1, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4, 
P8, PO3, PO4, O1, Oz, O2) and two additional electrodes placed above the left and right 
mastoids. The data was collected at a sampling rate of 1024 Hz, without any frequency filters. 
The recording reference and the ground electrodes (Common Mode Sense and Driven Right Leg 
electrodes in the ActiveTwo System; Metting van Rijn et al., 1990) were placed in close 
proximity to the Cz position. 
Electrophysiological data were processed with the EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme and 
Makeig, 2004) for Matlab (MathWorks Inc., Natick, USA). After changing the sampling rate to 
512 Hz (with Biosemi Decimator 86), the data was high-pass and low-pass filtered using 
Hamming-windowed sinc FIR filters with 0.3 Hz and 30 Hz cutoff frequencies, respectively 
(Widmann et al., 2015; Widmann and Schröger, 2012). Epochs starting at 100 ms before 
stimulus onset, and ending at 1300 ms after stimulus onset, were extracted, with baseline 
correction based on the whole epoch length. The entire recording was visually inspected for the 
removal of epochs with prominent artifacts such as baseline fluctuations or muscular activity. 
Ocular artifacts were removed with independent component analysis (ICA, Hyvärinen and Oja, 
2000) implemented in EEGLAB. This method separated independent subcomponents of the 
EEG, among which those associated with eye movements were identified on the basis of visual 
inspection of their single-trial activations and scalp topography, and rejected. After applying a 
new baseline correction (from -100 ms to 0 ms), the recording was again visually inspected to 
reject epochs with smaller artifacts. The mean and standard deviation of the remaining epochs 
for each stimulus (i.e., for each presented name for each participant) was 40.57±6.34. Finally, the 
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data was filtered again by applying a Hamming-windowed sinc FIR low-pass filter with 6 Hz 
cutoff frequency (Rosenfeld et al., 2008; Soskins et al., 2001), and the EEG was re-referenced to 
linked mastoids. For all statistical analyses, the P300 was measured at Pz only. 
 
2.4. P300 measure and individual bootstrap analysis 
For individual classification using P300 waves, a certain bootstrapping method has been 
used in all CTP studies, which compares the responses to the probe item with the responses to 
irrelevant items (see also: Farwell and Donchin, 1991; Wasserman and Bockenholt, 1989). This 
method uses a peak-to-peak measure (Rosenfeld, 2011; Rosenfeld et al., 2008; Soskins et al., 
2001): in our case, an algorithm searched, on the averaged epoch of a certain stimulus type (as 
described below), for the maximum average 100 ms segment between 500 and 800 ms, and then, 
between the midpoint of this segment and 1300 ms, searched again for a minimum average 100 
ms segment. The choice of the search window was based on visually inspecting the grand 
average of all participants, verifying that the P300 peak fell within the specified window (Keil et 
al., 2014; also cited by Rosenfeld et al., 2015b). The resulting value is the amplitude value of the 
peak-to-peak P300, which will be referred to as P300pp in the rest of this paper.  
The procedure of the bootstrapping analysis for the P vs. Iall measure was the following. 
First, single trials were chosen randomly, with replacement, from all probe single trials (i.e., 
trials in which the probe item had been presented), and averaged into one epoch, from which a 
P300pp was calculated. The number of these chosen values was equal to the number of available 
probe trials in case of the given individual’s results (i.e., the number of artifact-free epochs out of 
the original 50 recorded during the experiment). Second, a same number of single trials were 
again chosen randomly, with replacement, from all irrelevant single trials (i.e., trials in which 
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one of the irrelevant items had been presented), and averaged into one epoch, from which 
another P300pp was calculated. Third, the P300pp obtained from the probe trials was compared 
to the P300pp obtained from irrelevant trials, in order to determine whether the former is greater 
than the latter (with a difference greater than zero). These three steps were repeated 1000 times, 
with results possibly varying according to the random choices with replacement. The end result 
of this procedure is a number between 0-1000, indicating the number of occasions in which the 
P300pp values of the probe trials were determined to be greater in comparison to those of the 
irrelevant trials.  
The procedure for the P vs. Imax measure is exactly the same as the one for the P vs. Iall 
measure, except that the responses to the probe item were eventually compared to only one 
irrelevant item, the one which had evoked the largest P300pp, as measured with the bootstrap 
analysis. This individually varying largest irrelevant is called the “Imax.” In order to select this 
Imax, an algorithm separately compared each of the six irrelevant items to the probe, which 
again resulted in a number between 0-1000, indicating the number of occasions in which the 
P300pp values of the probe were determined to be greater than those of the given irrelevant. The 
Imax was then selected from among all these six irrelevant items, to be the one in whose case 
this number was the smallest – and this smallest number is the result of the P vs. Imax measure 
for the given individual. 
 
2.5. Group level comparisons 
The distribution of behavioral data (mean item detection accuracy and reaction times) 
was entered into repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) with Stimulus Type (main 
task: probe vs. Iall; probe vs. I-2item vs. I-4item; secondary task: target vs. non-target) as within-
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subject factor and Group (I, SG, New-CM, Old-CM) as between-subject factor. The comparison 
between probe, I-2item and I-4item response latencies was necessary to show that any effects 
between probe vs. irrelevant items in the New-CM and/or Old-CM groups are due to the use of 
countermeasures. 
Simple P300pp amplitudes – i.e., P300pp calculated from all single trials of the given 
stimulus type – were analyzed in three steps. First, a repeated-measures ANOVA was used to 
assess probe vs. Iall effects (Type as within-subject factor) between experimental groups. Then, a 
probe vs. Imax vs. Iremaining ANOVA was used to investigate the efficacy of the Imax measure 
in all four groups. Finally, with the probe vs. I-2item vs. I-4item statistical comparison between 
the two CM groups we aimed to show that the effect of countermeasures was more prominent in 
the New-CM group than in participants using the Old-CM technique. 
Results of the individual bootstrap analysis (probe vs. Iall; probe vs. Imax) were used to 
classify participants as “innocent” or “guilty”. One may set a cutoff rate, for example at 90% 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2013). In that case, when the P vs. Iall or P vs. Imax result for the individual is 
a number larger than 900 (i.e., the P300pp values of the probe trials were determined to be 
greater in more than 900 out of the 1000 calculations), then the participant is classified as guilty. 
For illustration, we report classification at several possible cutoffs (at 90%, 70%, and 50%), 
showing true negative rates (ratio of correctly identified innocent participants) in the case of the 
Control group and true positive rates (ratio of correctly identified guilty participants) in the cases 
of the SG and CM groups. However, for a more comprehensive assessment of classification 
accuracy, we calculated areas under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC curve, 
or simply AUC – area under the curve; e.g., National Research Council, 2003, pp. 342–344). 
This method measures true positive and true negative rates at all possible cut-off points and gives 
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an averaged value that can range from 0 to 1, where 0.5 means chance level classification, and 1 
means flawless classification (i.e. all guilty and innocent classifications can be correctly made at 
a given cutoff point). The AUC was first calculated for the P vs. Iall results for each of the three 
guilty groups (SG, New-CM, Old-CM) paired with the P vs. Iall results of the Control group, and 
the resulting AUCs were compared using z tests (Hanley & McNeil, 1982). Finally, the same 
calculations and comparisons were made using the P vs. Imax results. 
We used an alpha level of .05 for all statistical tests except for the bootstrapping measure. 
For each ANOVA with significant Group x Type interactions (p < .05), simple effects were 
tested using t-tests with Bonferroni correction. For violations of sphericity, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected p values and the relevant epsilon (ε) correction are reported. In order to demonstrate 
the magnitude of the observed effects, partial eta-squared (ηp2) values are also shown. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Behavioral measures 
Accuracies and mean reaction times for the main and secondary tasks for all stimulus 
types and each experimental group are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) for Accuracies and Reaction Times (RT) to Specific 
Types of Items, by Each of the Four Groups 
 
  Groups 
  Control  SG  New-CM  Old-CM 
  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Accuracies (%)             
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Main task             
Probe  98.43 2.50  99.33 1.63  98.67 1.80  99.00 1.46 
Iall  99.33 0.82  98.98 0.65  99.27 0.59  98.96 1.10 
I-2item  - -  - -  99.27 0.70  98.63 1.67 
I-4item  - -  - -  99.27 0.82  99.13 1.10 
Secondary task             
Target  87.45 14.82  83.24 15.2  79.14 20.61  83.57 15.34 
Non-target  98.85 1.14  97.69 2.23  97.62 2.01  98.39 0.96 
RT (ms)             
Main task             
Probe  541 155  592 141  533 138  518 121 
Iall  547 172  550 140  518 140  488 119 
I-2item  - -  - -  542 154  524 157 
I-4item  - -  - -  507 135  471 104 
Secondary task             
Target  647 134  648 88  587 102  557 72 
Non-target  595 163  577 108  509 127  479 88 
 
Note. Main task: Accuracies and RTs during the main task with family names. Probe – 
participant’s own name; Iall – all names except the participant’s own; I-2item – the two names 
that belonged to the smaller group of two items targeted by articulating the same words in the 
New-CM group (participants using the new countermeasures), and by articulating two different 
words in the Old-CM group (participants using the original countermeasures); I-4item – the four 
names that belonged to the larger group of four items that were targeted by articulating another 
word in the New-CM group, and simply omitted in the Old-CM group. There were no such 
groups of countered items (I-2item or I4-item) in the SG group (simple guilty participants) or in 
the Control group (innocent participants). Secondary task: Accuracies and RTs during the 
secondary task with number strings. Target – the catch trials of “11111” strings that required 
response with the middle finger; Non-target – the rest of the number strings that required 
response with the index finger. 
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In the main task, where all stimuli required the same response, mistakes and omitted 
responses were very rare in all conditions (see Table 1), and no statistically significant main 
effects or interactions were found (p > .2). In the secondary task, however, the participants' 
accuracies were significantly worse for target stimuli “11111” than for other strings (83±2.2% 
vs. 98±0.2%; F(1,56) = 51.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .48). This effect was not influenced by Group.  
In the main task, the participants’ reaction times were significantly slower for probe 
stimuli than for all the irrelevants (Iall) (546 ±17 ms vs. 525±18 ms; F(1,56) = 21.6, p < .001, ηp2 
= .28), but this effect varied with Group significantly (F(3,56) = 5.6, p = .002, ηp2 = .23). 
Bonferroni-corrected tests of simple effects revealed that the probe vs. Iall comparison was 
significant for the SG (p < .001) and Old-CM groups (p = .001) only. The main effect of Group 
was not significant. In the two CM groups, the I-2item and I-4item stimuli were also compared 
with each other, and the probe. The significant Stimulus Type effect (F(2,58) = 12.1, ε = .754, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .29) indicated that response times for probe (525±23 ms) and I-2item (532±27 ms) 
stimuli were substantially longer than those obtained for I-4item stimuli (488±21 ms), with the 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests being significant for both the P vs. I-4item (p < .001) and I-2item vs. I-
4item (p = .002) comparisons. Again, the main effect of Group and its interaction with Stimulus 
Type (P vs. I-2item vs. I-4item) were not significant (p > .2). 
Regarding the secondary task, responses to target stimuli were slower than to other 
stimuli (609±12 ms vs. 539±15 ms; F(1,56) = 88.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .61) and this effect was not 
influenced by Group. Interestingly, we have also found a significant Group main effect ( F(3,56) 
= 3.2, p = .035, ηp2 = .15), but none of the post-hoc comparisons reached significance level (p > 
.072). 
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3.2. Electrophysiological measures 
Event-related potentials obtained for probe, Iall and Imax stimuli for all four 
experimental groups are shown in Figure 2, whereas means and standard deviations for P300pp 
amplitudes evoked by probe, Iall, I-2item and I-4item items are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2. Grand average event-related brain potential waveforms registered on the parietal 
electrode Pz, as evoked by the following stimuli: Probe (own family name), Imax (the one 
irrelevant family name that evoked the largest P300pp), and Iall (all irrelevant family names); 
within each of the four experimental groups: Control (innocent), SG (simple guilty), New-CM 
(participants using the new countermeasures), Old-CM (participants using the original 
countermeasures). Please note that on the group level, in the New-CM group, the P300pp evoked 
by the Imax item is even slightly larger than that evoked by the probe. 
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Figure 3. Means and standard deviations of peak-to-peak P300 amplitudes registered on the 
parietal electrode Pz, for the following stimuli: Probe (own name), Iall (all irrelevant names), I-
2item (the two names that belonged to the smaller group of two items targeted by articulating the 
same words in the New-CM group, and by articulating two different words in the Old-CM 
group), and I-4item (the four names that belonged to the larger group of four items that were 
targeted by articulating another word in the New-CM group, and simply omitted in the Old-CM 
group); within each of the four experimental groups: Control (innocent), SG (simple guilty), 
New-CM (participants using the new countermeasures), Old-CM (participants using the original 
countermeasures). 
 
 3.2.1. P300pp amplitudes 
As expected, Probe stimuli evoked significantly larger P300pp amplitudes than irrelevant 
(Iall) items (main effect of Stimulus Type: F(1,56) = 167.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .75; Figure 3). 
Furthermore, there was a significant Stimulus Type x Group interaction (F(3,56) = 20.5, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .52). Bonferroni-corrected tests of simple effects indicated that the P300 evoked by 
  25
Probe items was significantly smaller in the Control group than for SG participants (p = .010), 
and a trend was observed for the Control vs. Old-CM comparison (p = .053; and p > 0.1 for the 
rest of the comparisons between any two of the four groups). The P300 measured for Iall items 
did not differ between groups (p > .999). When performing post-hoc Probe vs. Iall comparisons 
for each group separately, highly significant differences were found for the SG, New-CM and 
Old-CM groups (p < .001), while amplitudes were comparable in the Control group (p = .728). 
The main effect of Group was not significant. 
When comparing the P300pp amplitudes evoked by Probe items, Imax items (irrelevant 
items with the largest P300pp), and Iremaining items (the means of the other five irrelevant 
items), the main effect of Stimulus Type was significant ( F(2,112) = 85.9, ε = .850, p < .001, ηp2 
= .61): the largest P300pp means were for Probe, smaller for Imax, and smallest for Iremaining 
(for all comparisons, Bonferroni-corrected tests gave p < .002). The significant Stimulus Type x 
Group interaction (F(6,112) = 14.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .43) indicated that the P300pp amplitudes 
were significantly larger for Probes than for Imax items in the SG (p < .001) and Old-CM (p < 
.001) groups, but were not found to be significantly different in the New-CM group (p > .999), 
and were significantly larger for Imax than for Probe items in the Control group (p = .008) 
(Figure 2). Furthermore, the P300pp amplitudes were significantly larger for Probes than for 
Iremaining stimuli in the SG, Old-CM and New-CM groups, but not in the Control group 
(Bonferroni-corrected tests of simple effects for guilty groups: p < .001; for the Control group: p 
= .645). P300pp amplitudes were significantly larger for Imax than for Iremaining in the Control, 
New-CM and Old-CM groups (p < .001), while only a tendency was observed in for SG 
participants (p = .067). Again, the main effect of Group was not significant. 
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In order to test if increased P300pp amplitudes in the CM groups were indeed caused by 
countermeasure strategies, i.e., due to increased waveforms for the I-2item (the smaller group of 
countered irrelevant items), a second repeated-measures ANOVA was performed with Probe, I-
2item, and I-4item stimuli as levels of Stimulus Type, and New-CM and Old-CM groups as 
levels of Group. The significant Stimulus Type x Group interaction (F(2,58) = 3.5, p = .037, ηp2 
= .11) was indicative of robust P vs. I-2item amplitude differences in the Old-CM group only 
(Bonferroni-corrected tests of simple effects: p < .001), while similar amplitude reductions 
between I-2item vs. I-4item stimuli were observed in both CM groups (New-CM: p = .033, Old-
CM: p < .001; Figure 3). Finally, to see whether the difference between I-2item and I-4item 
differs in magnitude between New-CM and Old-CM groups, the ANOVA was rerun with the 
Probe omitted. The Stimulus Type (I-2item, I-4item) x Group interaction was not significant 
(F(1,29) = 1.5, p = .227, ηp2 = .05). 
 
3.2.2. Individual classification based on the bootstrap analysis 
Participants were classified guilty or innocent based on the results of the P vs. Iall and P 
vs. Imax measures – as described in Methods (Section 2.4. and Section 2.5.). Correct detection 
rates using cutoffs at 90%, 70%, and 50% are shown in Table 2, along with AUCs for each 
group, for P vs. Iall and for P vs. Imax, for which ROC curves are also shown in Figure 4. In the 
case of classification using P vs. Iall measures (SG: AUC = .976, CI: .930 – 1; New-CM: AUC = 
.943, CI: .858 – 1; Old-CM: AUC = .929, CI: .831 – 1), no significant differences were found 
between the AUCs of any two of the three guilty groups (p > .3). In the case of P vs. Imax 
measures (SG: AUC = .981, CI: .943 - 1; New-CM: AUC = .776, CI: .598 - .954 for; Old-CM: 
AUC = .911, CI: .811 - 1), the AUC of the SG group was significantly larger than the AUC of 
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the New-CM group (z = 2.21, p = .027) – meaning that the results of SG group’s guilty 
participants, compared with the results of New-CM group’s guilty participants, were 
significantly more distinct from the results of the Control group’s innocent participants. No 
significant differences were found between the AUCs of the SG and the Old-CM groups (z = 
1.29, p = .199) or between the AUCs of the New-CM and the Old-CM groups (z = -1.29, p = 
.196).2 
 
Table 2 
P vs. Iall and P vs. Imax Bootstrap Results for Each Participant 
 P vs. Iall  P vs. Imax 
Subject Control SG NewCM  OldCM  Control SG NewCM OldCM 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
964 
569 
574 
244 
604 
311 
325 
780 
699 
729 
808 
301 
793 
679 
 
 
1000 
768 
995 
986 
1000 
998 
902 
1000 
1000 
992 
996 
997 
995 
1000 
1000 
 
999 
971 
998 
991 
1000 
1000 
997 
906 
1000 
889 
617 
936 
905 
1000 
842 
 
999 
940 
1000 
1000 
998 
992 
1000 
1000 
975 
962 
984 
475 
999 
1000 
997 
748 
636 
12 
183 
11 
300 
50 
6 
230 
332 
197 
178 
63 
98 
424 
984
307
983
865
986
972
578
997
990
924
865
870
942
1000
1000
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
995
722
952
727
345
996
78
272
969
2
92
887
710
515
103
 
 a 
 
 a 
 a 
 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 
 
 a 
 a 
989
291
994
892
897
415
389
919
690
347
492
205
982
1000
939
259
 a 
 a 
 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 
 a 
 a 
 a 
 
 
 a 
 a 
Mean 599 975 936 942 194 884  557  669
                                                            
2 In order to demonstrate the overall effect of countermeasures, we also performed additional AUC calculations for 
the CM groups merged into one CM group that can be defined simply as “participants instructed to use 
countermeasures” (resulting in AUC = .935, CI: .865 – 1 using P vs. Iall; and AUC = .846, CI: .733 - .959 using P 
vs. Imax). In the case of the P vs. Imax measure, the AUC of the SG group was significantly larger than the AUC of 
this merged CM group (z = 2.23, p = .026), i.e., the P vs. Imax results of this merged CM group were more distinct 
from those of the Control group. Again, no significant differences were found in the case of the P vs. Iall measure (p 
> .3). 
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TR-9 .93 .93 .80 .88 1 .67  .27  .38
TR-7 .64 1 .93 .94 1 .87  .53  .50
TR-5 .29 1 1 .94 .93 .93  .60  .56
AUC - .98 .94 .93 - .98  .78  .91
 
Note. Group averages of the bootstrapping results are given below each corresponding column, 
in boldface (and rounded to whole numbers). TR: true negative rates (in the case of the Control 
group) and true positive rates (in the cases of the SG and CM groups) of correct individual 
classifications (number of correctly classified participants / number of participants) based on the 
P vs. Iall or P vs. Imax measures, with possible cutoffs, for illustration, at 900 (TR-9), 700 (TR-
7), and 500 (TR-5) – where numbers below/above the given cutoff mean innocent/guilty 
classifications, respectively, for the given participant. AUC: areas under the curve for the three 
guilty (SG, Old-CM, New-CM) groups for the two measures (P vs. Iall and P vs. Imax), where 
each AUC uses the Control group’s results of the same measure to calculate classification 
efficiency. 
a One of the two countermeasure-target irrelevant items was the Imax.  
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Figure 4. ROC curves showing the true positives rates of the three guilty (SG, Old-CM, New-
CM) groups in function of the false positive rates of the Control group (for the results of the P vs. 
Iall on the left, and for the results of the P vs. Imax on the right). 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Effects of “small group” countermeasures on the P vs. Imax measure  
The main purpose of our study was to show that the CTP version of the P300-based CIT, 
which has repeatedly been claimed to be highly resistant (or even immune) to countermeasures 
(Rosenfeld, 2011; Rosenfeld et al., 2013, 2008), can in fact be severely vulnerable to certain 
countermeasures, when using the P vs. Imax measure, i.e., when the probe (the critical 
information, e.g., crime detail) is compared to the Imax (the one irrelevant information which has 
evoked the largest P300pp responses). An effective countermeasure can be accomplished by 
covert responses to a small group of irrelevant items, and a different response, or no response at 
all, to all other items. This makes the items of the small group subjectively unique compared to 
the others, thereby evoking prominent P300pp waves, which can approximate or even overcome 
those evoked by the probe, reducing detection rates when using the P vs. Imax measure (Figure 
2).  
To show this, for one, we have instructed the participants in the Old-CM group to use 
countermeasures that were used in previous studies, but whose effect, when used only on a 
smaller group of irrelevant items, has not been tested on the P vs. Imax measure, until now. For 
another, we have also introduced a slightly modified new version of these countermeasures, 
which was used by the participants in the New-CM group. In this latter case, all items were 
divided into a smaller and a larger group, and all items required a covert response according to 
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group membership. The smaller group included two irrelevant items, targeted to be “oddballs,” 
and the larger group included all the five other items (the probe and the four other irrelevant 
items). Furthermore, silent articulation of simple, easily distinguishable words (instead of 
personal names) were used for covert responses, in order to simplify the countermeasure task. 
The effects of this new countermeasure did prove to be somewhat more effective than the 
original one, and consequently helped us provide more convincing proof for the vulnerability of 
the P vs. Imax measure.  
Our main results indeed show that participants in both CM groups have used the 
countermeasures against the P vs. Imax measure with success, generally achieving to be more 
difficult to distinguish from innocent participants, than those guilty participants who were not 
instructed to use countermeasures (AUC = .85 for CM participants vs. AUC = .98 for simple 
guilty participants) – though this difference was especially pronounced for those who used the 
new countermeasures (AUC = .78 for New-CM participants). Importantly, we also found, same 
as previous studies (Hu et al., 2012; Labkovsky and Rosenfeld, 2012; Rosenfeld et al., 2008; 
Rosenfeld and Labkovsky, 2010; Winograd and Rosenfeld, 2011), that the P vs. Iall measure 
(probe compared to all irrelevant items) provided high detection rates not only in the SG group 
(AUC = .98), but also in both CM groups (AUC = .93 using the original, and AUC = .94 using 
the new countermeasures), with no significant differences between the three groups. This also 
makes our study the first to show that the results of the P vs. Iall and the P vs. Imax measures, 
which have been shown to provide very similar accuracies in all previous experiments (Meixner 
et al., 2009; Meixner and Rosenfeld, 2014, 2011; Rosenfeld et al., 2008; Rosenfeld and 
Labkovsky, 2010), can in fact differ greatly. 
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The P vs. Imax measure was in fact never shown to provide substantially higher 
accuracies than the P vs. Iall measure. Consequently, we could suggest that the P vs. Imax 
measure, as a basis for guilty/innocent classifications, should simply be avoided in the future. On 
the other hand, our countermeasures increase false-negative rates for the P vs. Imax measure, but 
do not alter the fact that this measure provides high specificity (i.e., less false positive 
classifications; see Section 1.2; and, regarding our concurring results, see TR rows in Table 2 or 
the ROC curves in Figure 4). Thus, the limitation arises when the probe P300pp is not found to 
be significantly larger than the Imax P300pp: in this case, the examinee may have used 
countermeasures, leading to a false negative classification. However, in practice, the P vs. Imax 
measure may still be useful to support the reliability of a positive finding: if the probe P300pp is 
not only significantly larger than the P300pp for the rest of the irrelevants, but also significantly 
larger than the Imax P300pp, than the guilty classification can be seen as more reliable. 
We have noted in the Introduction (Section 1.2.) that the CIT may also be used in cases 
when the probe is unknown. In this case, a suspect would be shown several items which are 
suspected to contain a relevant information (e.g., the possible locations of an upcoming terrorist 
attack), and the information that evokes the largest P300pp would be determined to be the 
presumed probe, whose P300pp is subsequently compared to those of the others (Meixner and 
Rosenfeld, 2011; Rosenfeld, 2011). In our study, we first looked for the Imax among the 
irrelevant items, and then compared it to the probe. Logically, in each case when this Imax 
proved to evoke a P300pp larger than that of the probe, the Imax was in fact also proven to have 
evoked the largest P300pp among all items (thus also including the actual probe), and therefore 
would have been, in an unknown-probe scenario, incorrectly selected as the presumed probe. 
According to our results, out of the 31 countermeasure user participants, 13 (42%) would have 
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succeeded in making us select a wrong item (an irrelevant) to be the presumed probe (see Table 
2, where the P vs. Imax iterations below 500 signify that, in the bootstrap analysis, the probe 
P300pp was determined to be smaller than the Imax; which was the case in 6 cases out of 15 in 
the New-CM group, and in 7 cases out of 16 in Old-CM, although only in 1 case out of 15 in the 
SG group; as also shown in the TR-5 row in Table 2). In such a case, we may run another 
analysis, comparing the presumed probe to irrelevant items (either by P vs. Iall or P vs. Imax 
measure), and accordingly classify the examinee as innocent or guilty – but, in the case of a 
guilty classification, we would have, unfortunately, no way of knowing whether the presumed 
probe (the item, which evoked the largest P300pp responses), is the actual probe, or a countered 
irrelevant. That makes the unknown-probe scenario, as described in the article of Meixner and 
Rosenfeld (2011), highly vulnerable to countermeasures. The solution for this problem awaits 
further studies on this matter. 
Our results corroborate previous findings by Rosenfeld and his colleagues, including, 
most importantly, very high detection accuracy, and therefore we conclude that the replication of 
the CTP protocol was successful. However, further independent studies would be needed for a 
thorough validation of this method. In particular, it should be noted that we have used personal 
items (family names) as probes in our study, which, in the case of P300-based studies, generally 
leads to higher detection accuracies when compared to crime details (e.g., a weapon used in a 
recent crime; Meijer et al., 2014). Therefore, future studies should also assess the validity of the 
method when using crime details, e.g., in a mock-crime, preferably in field settings. 
Finally, we want to point out a methodological issue that could have introduced a minor 
confound to our results. Namely, different stimuli were presented in the first practice task to the 
New-CM and Old-CM groups (given names and month names, respectively), which might have 
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facilitated countermeasure application for New-CM participants in the main task, since it also 
relied on names. Although we argue that this is very unlikely because (1) the stimulus sets seen 
by the New-CM group were completely different (practice task: given names, main task: family 
names) and (2) the two tasks were separated by a second practice task that used city names in all 
experimental groups, we acknowledge that it would have been better to use the same stimulus set 
(e.g., month names) for training in both CM groups. 
 
4.3. Summary 
In this study, we have shown that the P vs. Imax measure of the CTP method (Rosenfeld 
et al., 2013, 2008) can be defeated by covertly creating a small group of “oddball” items among 
the presented irrelevant items, thereby making their P300pp responses statistically 
indistinguishable from those of the probe item. We have also shown that countermeasures can be 
further enhanced for this specific reason. Although these countermeasures strongly reduced 
detection rates when using the P vs. Imax measure, our results corroborated previous studies in 
that the P vs. Iall measure provided high detection rates in all groups, and thereby proved to be 
resistant to both the original and the modified countermeasures. 
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